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CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND 
ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION: ON A 
WHIM AND A PRAYER? 
Juliet Chevalier-Watts* 
The advancement of religion is a controversial head of charitable trusts: whilst its foundations are 
based on tenets of intangible belief systems, New Zealand law, alongside other common law 
jurisdictions, supports the notion that the public benefit requirement of all charitable trusts be 
presumed in this particular head. Common law also reflects decades of evolution of the 
interpretation of the advancement of religion, thus not limiting the advancement of religion to only 
the traditional methods of yesteryear, such as offering church services. Nevertheless, with the recent 
contentious judgment in the New Zealand case of Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, this article 
submits that the established doctrines associated with the advancement of religion have been 
advanced beyond envisioned boundaries. The article supports a more conservative interpretation 
based on established case law. This would not only continue to support fully the evolution of the 
advancement of religion, but would also provide judicial certainty in an area of law that is 
undergoing continued change. 
I INTRODUCTION 
The jurisprudence relating to charitable trusts in New Zealand, as with other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, has undergone significant development in recent years as challenging contemporary 
matters come before the courts. Courts inevitably find themselves addressing the boundaries of 
common law doctrines to unravel the implied constraints of public policy and doctrinal 
considerations, and it is clear that the common law offers little in the way of guidance in relation to 
many of these contemporary challenges. As a result, courts are faced with the prospect of restraining 
some doctrines when contemporary times suggest the need for expansion of doctrines, or expanding 
the boundaries at the risk of raising public policy issues. This article considers such issues related to 
the advancement of religion in light of the recent controversial New Zealand High Court case, 
Liberty Trust v Charities Commission.1 I submit that, on balance, the judgment advances the 
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doctrines associated with the advancement of religion beyond envisioned boundaries, and in doing 
so, generates concerns relating to judicial certainty. Such uncertainty should, in my view, be of 
primary concern, especially in light of the substantial evolutionary changes to which charitable 
trusts have been subject in recent times. 
Liberty Trust was registered as a charitable entity in 2007 under the Charities Act 2005. Its main 
activity is to act as a mortgage lending scheme that is funded largely by donations. It makes interest 
free loans to its donors and others who may apply. The scope of its lending scheme led to a review 
of its charitable status and then led to the Charities Commission removing the Trust from its 
charities register.2 
The Trust appealed that decision, submitting that its lending scheme advanced religion, which 
fell within the construct of "charitable purpose". The Trust submitted that the lending scheme 
advanced religion by teaching biblical financial principles. The Charities Commission rejected that 
submission, stating that teaching financial principles was at best conducive to religion, but this did 
not mean that it would advance religion. The Commission viewed the lending scheme as furthering 
private benefits, as opposed to having public benefits. 
The argument in the Liberty Trust case focused on the advancement of religion, one of the four 
heads of charity discussed below. Mallon J found that teaching financial principles equated to the 
teaching of biblical principles and that the loan scheme accorded with the requirements of 
advancing religion. In addition, Mallon J considered the public benefit element of the scheme 
(discussed in detail later in the article) and concluded that the loan scheme had sufficient public 
benefit because anyone could apply for a loan, and there was no element of profit for anyone 
involved in the scheme.3 
II THE HEADS OF CHARITY 
For a trust to be charitable at law it must meet a number of criteria, including being for 
charitable purposes and satisfying the public benefit test.4 In addition, a trust must fall under one of 
the four heads of charity as set out by Lord Macnaghten in the pivotal case Commissioners for 
Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel.5 These four heads are: 
(1) the relief of poverty; 
  
1  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission [2011] 3 NZLR 68 (HC).  
2  Ibid, at [1]. 
3  At [101]–[125]; for general comment see Jonathan Scragg and Polly Higbee "Liberty's bell tolls for the 
Charities Commission" NZ Lawyer (online ed, Wellington, 12 August 2011) at 16. 
4  Juliet Chevalier-Watts "Trusts for Religious Purposes" [2010] NZLJ 55 at 55. 
5  Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531 (HL). 
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(2) the advancement of education; 
(3) the advancement of religion; and 
(4) other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any of the preceding heads. 
These heads of charity stemmed from the preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth 1601 (Eng), 
which set out a non-exhaustive list of charitable purposes recognised at law at the time.6 These 
charitable purposes included: the relief of aged and impotent people; the maintenance of sick and 
maimed soldiers and sailors; the repair of bridges and highways; and the education of orphans, 
amongst many others. It is possible however that the concept of charity existed long before the 
Statute of Elizabeth, and appears to have been recognised in the 12th century poem "The Vision of 
Piers Plowman", which sets out remarkably similar charitable purposes as those set out in the 
Statute of Elizabeth.7 
The Pemsel categorisation "formed the framework for statutory recognition of charitable 
purpose, as recognised in s 5(1) of the Charities Act 2005 in New Zealand, and in England and 
Wales, the Charities Act 2006."8 
In light of the decision in Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, this article critically analyses 
the response of the law to the shifting sands of religious environments and expectations, and 
examines whether the law is now permitting an arguably overtly flexible criterion of the 
advancement of religion. 
III THE MEANING OF RELIGION 
Christian beliefs have for centuries been a centre place in Western civilised culture, which has 
traditionally valued the worship of a single god. Christianity continues to be considered a major 
religion, but with the advent of advances in travel, media and information, Western cultures have 
now absorbed many more religions including Islam, Buddhism and Sikhism. The tenets and 
concepts of such religions may differ substantially from those of Christianity, but the law of charity 
is concerned not just with the belief in one deity, but the belief in some kind of power of the 
supernatural.9 Thus religion is widely construed by the courts:10 
  
6  Also known as the Statute of Charitable Uses 1601 (Eng) 43 Eliz I c 4. 
7  William Langland "Vision of Piers Plowman: Passus VII" in Carl Juneau "Is Religion Passé as a Charity?" 
(1999) 2 Church & the Law Update 1 at 3. 
8  Chevalier-Watts, above n 4, at 55. 
9  Donovan Waters "The advancement of religion in a pluralist society (Part I): distinguishing religion from 
giving to 'charity'" (2011) 17 Trusts & Trustees 652 at 653–654. 
10  Church of the New Faith v Commissioner of Pay-roll Tax [1983] 1 VR 97 (SC) at 136. 
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… the criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and 
second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, though canons of 
conduct which offend against the ordinary laws are outside the area of any immunity, privilege or right 
conferred on the grounds of religion. Those criteria may vary in their comparative importance, and there 
may be a different intensity of belief or of acceptance of canons of conduct among religions or among 
the adherents to a religion. The tenets of religion may give primacy to one particular belief or to one 
particular canon of conduct. Variations in emphasis may distinguish one religion from other religions, 
but they are irrelevant to the determination of an individual's or a group's freedom to profess and 
exercise the religion of his, or their, choice. 
Therefore courts will not distinguish between religions.11 As Gino Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers 
explain, the "question of whether or not something is a religion turns on its beliefs, practices and 
observations, not on the verity or meaning of its writings."12 It has been argued that Buddhism may 
be the exception to the requirement that a religion for charitable purposes is dependent on a belief in 
a god, a supernatural or a supreme being, because Buddhism does not adhere to such a belief.13 In 
response to this submission, Dillon J in Re South Place Ethical Society resisted further discussion by 
commenting that "I do not think it is necessary to explore that further in this judgment, because I do 
not know enough about Buddhism."14 However, Dillon J did acknowledge that Buddhism may be 
an exception to the rule, as submitted by Lord Denning in Reg v Registrar General, Ex parte 
Segerdal,15 or in the alternative, that actually it is a religion because of the evidence provided by an 
expert who denied that Buddhists reject a supreme being.16 Dillon J was, however, keen to quash 
any suggestions "that Buddhism is not a religion" although it was a pertinent discussion with regard 
to the complexities of the meaning of religion and the challenges facing the courts.17 
  
11  See Thornton v Howe (1862) 31 Beav 14, 54 ER 1042 (Ch) at 1044. 
12  Gino Dal Pont and DRC Chalmers Equity and Trusts in Australia (4th ed, Thomson Reuters, New South 
Wales, 2007) at 757.  
13  Re South Place Ethical Society [1980] 1 WLR 1565 (Ch); see also United States v Seeger 380 US 163 
(1965). 
14  At 1573. 
15  Reg v Registrar General, Ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697 (CA) at 707. 
16  Re South Place Ethical Society, above n 13, at 1573. 
17  Ibid. 
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IV WHEN IS A RELIGION CHARITABLE? 
The question "what is it that makes religion charitable"18 has been asked and Juneau answers it 
thus:19 
Beyond faith, it has taught us to respect human life; it has taught us to respect property; it has taught us 
to respect God's creation; it has taught us to abhor violence; it has taught us to help one another; it has 
taught us honesty. In essence what makes religion "good" from a societal point of view is that it makes 
us want to become better – it makes people become better members of society. 
The fact that trusts that advance religion can obtain charitable status has not, however, been 
without its critics in light of the growing number of agnostics and atheists. Moreover, there is a very 
real issue (that will be considered in some detail later in the article) as to the actual tangible public 
benefit in the advancement of religion, not least because religious belief is inevitably such a 
personal experience. The question therefore arises as to why members of society should shoulder 
heavy tax burdens merely because of the beliefs of others.20 There is no simple answer of course to 
such a question, and it is one that is certainly beyond the remit of this article, but as Mallon J 
notes:21 
… our charities law has always accepted "advancement of religion" as a charitable purpose and in so 
doing has accepted that this is of public benefit such as to be entitled to the special status that entails. 
Some limit is placed on how far this category will extend by the organisation needing to satisfy the 
Charities Commission and the courts that they ascribe to a "religion" … and that the activity they engage 
in is part of that religion and done for the purpose of advancing that religion. 
So although the arguments of those who question the validity of the advancement of religion 
being charitable are not answered by Mallon J in any specific fashion, what is acknowledged is that 
there are obligations imposed on those seeking charitable status. Such obligations thus provide some 
assurance that trusts that advance religion must fulfil certain criteria and are indeed subject to 
scrutiny. This reduces any preconceived notions that trusts that advance religion are awarded 
charitable status as a matter of course. 
Therefore, for a religious purpose to be construed as charitable at law it must advance religion. 
This requires "the promotion of spiritual teaching in a broad sense, and involves spreading the 
  
18  Terence S Carter "Advancing Religion as a Head of Charity: What Are the Boundaries?" (2006) 20 The 
Philanthropist 257 at 261. 
19  Juneau, above n 7, at 6. 
20  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1. 
21  Ibid, at [55]. 
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religious message through taking positive steps such as pastoral activities."22 It is this very 
requirement that this article now turns to consider. 
V THE ADVANCEMENT OF RELIGION 
The advancement of religion is not defined by statute; rather, it finds its meaning in case law. 
Donovan J, delivering the judgment of the Divisional Court in United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free 
and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council concluded that:23 
To advance religion means to promote it, to spread its message ever wider among mankind; to take 
some positive steps to sustain and increase religious belief; and these things are done in a variety of 
ways which may be comprehensively described as pastoral and missionary. 
In the later case of Re South Place Ethical Society, Dillon J made reference to the United Grand 
Lodge case, affirming that whilst freemasons "held out certain standards of truth and justice by 
which masons were urged to regulate their conduct and … be reverent, honest, compassionate, loyal 
… and chaste"24 these were "admirable objects" as opposed to being for the advancement of 
religion. Dillon J also reiterated that "two … essential attributes of religion are faith and worship; 
faith in a god and worship of that god."25  
The approach in the United Grand Lodge case, as approved in Re South Place Ethical Society, 
has been affirmed in various jurisdictions, including Canada, where the Supreme Court of Canada 
noted that:26 
Religion … involves matters of faith and worship, and freedom of religion involves freedom in 
connection with the profession and dissemination of religious faith and the exercise of religious worship. 
New Zealand also ascribes to the notion that the advancement of religion is as prescribed in the 
United Grand Lodge case,27 although the advancement of religion may be construed more widely 
than prescribed in that case. It has been widely recognised by the courts that advancing religion may 
also encompass activities that are secular in nature but which embrace the crucial element of the 
religious doctrine itself, and this includes activities that address social, moral and ethical issues.28 In 
  
22  Juliet Chevalier-Watts "Under the Law of Charity, is the Principle of 'Public Benefit' Being Hindered by the 
Doctrinal Rule of Precedent?" (2008) 16 Waikato L Rev 194 at 200. 
23  United Grand Lodge of Ancient Free and Accepted Masons of England v Holborn Borough Council [1957] 
1 WLR 1080 (QB) at 1081. 
24  Re South Place Ethical Society, above n 13, at 1572. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Walter v Attorney-General of Alberta (1969) 3 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC) at 9. 
27  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [58]. 
28  Carter, above n 18, at 269. 
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the case of Public Trustee v Hood (Re Hood) the Court had to determine whether a "gift" (that is, 
directing the spread of the word of Christianity by encouraging others to take steps to reduce or stop 
drinking alcohol) was charitable.29 Lord Hanworth MR confirmed that such a gift was charitable 
because steps would be taken:30 
… for the advancement of the Christian Religion, and of Christian principles, by the withdrawal of the 
subtle and effective force which at the present time operates as a barrier against the advancement of the 
Christian religion and its principles. … It does not … appear that so far [the testator] has indicated 
anything but a purpose to advance the Christian religion and its principles. Then the direction is that the 
trust estate is to be held for the purpose of spreading those Christian principles, which, of course, are 
illustrative of the Christian religion, and also in aiding active steps to get rid of this barrier which 
prevents its advancement. 
In the more recent case of Lloyds Bank Ltd v Smith (Re Banfield (Deceased)), the Court 
considered the work of the Pilsdon Community House.31 This Community House was a religious 
community which agreed that prayer, work and practical charity should be its supreme purpose, and 
it received members of the public who needed help. The House opened its doors to any creed – or 
those with none – and received and tended to:32 
… the needs of those members of the public who need help for divers reasons, such as drug addiction, or 
drink, or having been in prison, or even loneliness or mere failure to stand up to the strains of life. 
The Court confirmed that such an organisation exists to further the work of God in a practical 
sense, and even if a religious body does engage in ancillary activities that are not purely religious, 
this will not necessarily defeat its religious nature.33 As a result, the Court stated that this 
Community House did advance religion and thus should be awarded charitable status. 
Such ideals are clearly laudable but I would echo the cautionary sentiments of the Charity 
Commission of England and Wales that:34 
It is difficult to see … how religion is being advanced unless it is possible for members of the public to 
make the connection in each case between the conduct of pastoral work of a secular kind on the one 
  
29  Public Trustee v Hood [1931] 1 Ch 240 (CA) at 248 [Re Hood]. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Lloyds Bank Ltd v Smith [1968] 1 WLR 846 (Ch) [Re Banfield (Deceased)].  
32  At 850. 
33  Ibid. 
34  United Kingdom Charity Commission "Analysis of the Law Underpinning the Advancement of Religion for 
the Public Benefit" (December 2008) <www.charity-commission.gov.uk> at 15. 
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hand and the advancement of the particular form of faith and worship which is the object of promotion 
on the other. 
In Re Banfield (Deceased), although it was not acknowledged explicitly, the Court did note that 
the Pilsdon Community reiterated its religious affinity repeatedly in its pamphlet.35 However, I 
would submit that this may not necessarily fully answer the concerns raised by the Charity 
Commission, and perhaps if the case were heard today there would be more active consideration of 
such an issue. However, the Liberty Trust case may provide a contemporary view of the correlation 
between secular work being carried out by a body and the clear advancement of a religion. 
A Liberty Trust v Charities Commission 
Liberty Trust was registered as a charitable entity in 2007 under the Charities Act 2005. Its main 
activity is to act as a mortgage lending scheme, making interest free loans to donors and other 
people. The scheme is funded mainly by donations. Its lending scheme prompted the Charities 
Commission to remove the Trust from the Charities Register; Liberty Trust appealed this decision to 
the High Court. 
The Trust asserted that its lending scheme advanced religion by demonstrating practical 
financial lessons derived from the Bible. The Charities Commission stated that "teaching financial 
principles derived from the Bible was at best conducive to religion but did not advance religion."36 
The Commission asserted, inter alia, that the Trust's emphasis was not on propagating the Christian 
doctrine, but rather on educating people through biblical financial principles, which included 
savings, spending and charitable giving. This then precluded the Trust's objectives from falling 
under the definition of "advancing religion".37 The Commission relied on Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor as authority for the proposition that teaching biblical financial 
principles would merely be conducive to religion as opposed to actually advancing religion.38  
The main question for determination in the Lawlor case was whether the establishment of a 
Catholic newspaper could advance religion. The Court acknowledged that, for it to be a newspaper, 
it obviously would contain "news" and this is likely to be secular in nature, but questioned 
whether:39  
  
35  At 850. 
36  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [2]. 
37  Ibid, at [65]. 
38  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor (1934) 51 CLR 1 (HCA). 
39  At 5. 
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… the Catholic Church [would] be any the less engaged in disseminating its religious doctrines and 
teachings merely because it chose to reach the public by supplying daily information and news, the main 
object throughout being the propagation of the faith?   
In answering this, the Court determined that the dominant purpose of the newspaper was to 
instruct Catholics in matters of faith, morals and Catholic teachings. Thus having subsidiary secular 
matters in the newspaper would not defeat the advancement of religion. Two of the Judges could see 
no difference between the Church disseminating its religious tenets through the medium of a 
newspaper and through the ordinary methods of preaching and sermons. Indeed, it was noted that 
the methods of preaching the faith are not static and will evolve over the years, thus a newspaper is 
merely evidence of such an evolution in the advancement of religion. The crux of the matter for the 
Court was whether the newspaper could perform the duties of the Church as it purported to be able 
to. The Court did not answer this explicitly, although, in a split decision, the Court did express the 
view that the newspaper is charitable.40 However, Rich J offered an opposing view, suggesting that 
the very nature of a newspaper, with the purpose of disseminating "news", is outside the notion of 
advancing the faith because it would simply remain as a newspaper being merely of general benefit 
to a body having common interests in faith and aspirations.41 
Dixon J concurred, noting that for a purpose to advance religion it must "involve the spread or 
strengthening of spiritual teaching within a wide sense".42 Not only must the secular activities be 
inspired by religion; the "purposes must be directly and immediately religious."43 As a result, Dixon 
J concluded that the newspaper could not be differentiated from similar newspapers which are not 
charitable as the newspaper would merely be conducive to religion as opposed to advancing 
religion.44  
In the Liberty Trust case, Mallon J preferred the submissions of the three Judges in Lawlor, 
Gavan Duffy CJ, Evatt and McTiernan JJ, who adopted a broad view of how religion may be 
advanced. Gavan Duffy CJ and Evatt J noted that they were:45 
… quite unable to see the difference between the Catholic Church's propagating its religious tenets and 
regulating the performance of religious duties (1) through a medium reaching into the homes of the 
multitude, including Catholics and non-Catholics, and (2) through the ordinary medium of sermons and 
  
40  At 17–18. 
41  At 23. 
42  At 32. 
43  Ibid. 
44  At 36. 
45  At 16. 
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tracts. The former may be as much a method of preaching the gospel as the more direct and obvious 
method of strengthening or extending faith through missions and sermons. 
I respectfully concur that this is the correct approach to take because it acknowledges the 
advancements in society regarding religious instruction and its dissemination. The law has already 
acknowledged the diversity of religions being caught under the Pemsel head of "advancement of 
religion", many of which undoubtedly could not have been foreseen at the time of the enactment of 
the Statute of Elizabeth. I submit that it is not such a great step to recognise that religion may be 
advanced through a religious newspaper, so long as the dominant purpose of that newspaper is to 
instruct those of that religion in "matters of faith and morals and of advancing and spreading the 
faith and teachings".46 Likewise, the teachings about budgeting and financial matters of the Liberty 
Trust are biblical teachings that are indeed presented as part of the "Word of God". There is no issue 
here for the Liberty Trust in disseminating secular information because the teachings disseminated 
by the Trust appear to maintain the religious doctrines upon which the teachings rest, and to 
promote and manifest those tenets. Therefore the biblical financial principles as taught by the 
Liberty Trust "are an aspect of Christian Faith as expounded by Liberty Trust"47 and such a finding 
casts doubt upon the original proposition that the judgment advances doctrines beyond envisioned 
boundaries. 
B The Advancement of Religion in Liberty Trust 
A question arises regarding the issue of Liberty Trust's loan scheme and whether Mallon J's 
determination that such a loan scheme does indeed advance religion is correct, or whether the 
decision profoundly bends the exigencies of the notions of the advancement of religion.   
Liberty Trust submitted that the loan scheme was a practical outworking of the Christian faith, 
and that one of the key concerns of the New Testament is that of the proper use of money and 
further, that freeing up those with financial burdens ensures that those individuals are then freer to 
carry out God's services.48 This latter point in particular was not addressed specifically by the Court, 
although the fact that it was asserted by Liberty Trust raises an interesting issue. In the recent case 
of Canterbury Development Corp v Charities Commission, the Court was asked to consider whether 
a community development purpose was a charitable purpose under New Zealand law.49 The 
appellant submitted that the work of Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) would lead to the 
generation of jobs and would advantage the overall economic condition of the region.50 The Court 
  
46  Roman Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne v Lawlor, above n 38, at 15. 
47  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [69]. 
48  Ibid, at [79]. 
49  Canterbury Development Corp v Charities Commission [2010] 2 NZLR 707 (HC). 
50  At [39]. 
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acknowledged that the objects and work of CDC were indeed commendable, but having 
commendable objects did not automatically meet the charitable purpose requirements. Instead the 
Court said "[t]hese are essentially the provision of help to individual businesses in the hope they will 
grow."51 In other words, the purposes must be more than hopeful, they must explicitly support a 
charitable purpose. Thus if the Liberty Trust unburdens individuals of their financial woes by 
providing financial assistance, there is a hope that in doing so, those individuals will be more able to 
service God's will. As with the Canterbury Development Corp case, this surely is no more than a 
hope. Whilst eminently commendable, removing individuals' financial burdens is not in itself a 
charitable purpose, and would suggest therefore that the Trust fails on this issue of charity. This 
matter will be considered further, later in this article. Though it is acknowledged that this is a moot 
point because it was not explicitly addressed by the Court, it will, however, be interesting to see if 
such an issue arises in future cases and how the Court will interpret such commendable objects. 
Instead, Mallon J in Liberty Trust considered the issues relating to the practical outworkings and 
advancement of religion and whether some activities may have a connection with religion while not 
actually constituting the advancement of religion. Mallon J referred in some detail to the opinion of 
Mahoney JA in the case of Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Ryde Municipal Council.52 
Mahoney JA submitted that:53 
Those purposes which are religious purposes within the law of charities, therefore, comprehend, not 
merely the formulation of doctrine and its propagation and the winning of adherents to it, but also 
certain of the means by which the religion is practised, e.g., the building of churches, the employment of 
ministers, and the holding of public services or ceremonies as prescribed by the religion. But the 
purposes of a church, may, and often do, extend beyond such purposes. 
Further Mahoney JA concluded that, certainly in relation to the instant case, the advancement of 
religion should not just be limited to the formulation and propagation of the doctrine, or the conduct 
of the relevant rituals.54 Religion may be advanced by bodies other than churches, although just 
because a body executes the advancement of religion, this does not automatically mean that the 
purposes of such bodies would be charitable.55 The Ryde case did not concern a church, but 
Mahoney JA determined that this should not preclude the Trust from being charitable because:56 
  
51  At [44]. 
52  Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust v Ryde Municipal Council [1978] 38 LGRA 199 (NSWCA). 
53  At 213. 
54  At 215. 
55  At 219. 
56  At 222. 
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… where a church or analogous body has as one of the purposes to which its property may be applied a 
purpose which is not a mere ulterior secular purpose, but one directed to and able to be seen as assisting 
in the advancement of its religious purpose, then the purpose of that religion will be able to be held 
religious for present purposes. 
Thus, in Mahoney JA's view, the Trust was "so intimately connected to the Church, that it 
should be accepted as within the same principle."57 Liberty Trust submitted that the Trust advanced 
religion through its practical outworkings in a similar fashion to that of the Ryde case, and that Ryde 
confirmed that these are activities that may be carried out by secular bodies. Mallon J agreed that 
this was the correct approach, and further dismissed the Charities Commission's notion that the 
Liberty Trust could not be construed as advancing religion because it was not a church. The Ryde 
case clearly states that a secular body can advance religious purposes, although the functions of that 
body should be intimately connected with a church. Liberty Trust asserted that it is a trust set up to 
undertake Christian ministrations of the Whakatane Baptist and the Whakatane Christian Fellowship 
Church, and Mallon J acknowledged the case of Re Hood as an example of an external body 
undertaking the advancement of religion but endeavouring to minimise the alcohol trade. Her 
Honour also acknowledged Re Banfield, where a religious community open to all faiths and creeds 
carried out Christian work to improve the lives of those who needed such assistance.58 There is no 
doubting that case law reflects the broad interpretation of the meaning of "advancement of religion" 
and that there is no reason why religious activities should be limited merely to traditional 
formulations associated with soul saving and sanctification. Thus the original proposition offers 
superficial assistance. Therefore, prima facie, Liberty Trust provides an example of non-secular 
activities being carried out by a secular body, although as required by the Ryde case, its functions 
are connected closely enough with a church that as a result, its activities may comply with the 
requirements of advancing religion. However, the question still remains as to whether the loan 
scheme falls within the constructs of advancing religion. 
Mallon J was clear that "a mortgage scheme in and of itself is not an obvious candidate for the 
'advancement of religion'".59 It would not advance religion automatically merely because it is 
operated by those who subscribe to the religion, or because its founder believes that the scheme 
propagates the will of God, or His teachings. Mallon J rightly stated that the scheme must do more 
than have a connection with, or be conducive to, religion. Her Honour asserted that the lending 
scheme teaches religion as intended by the Scriptures and as a result spreads the message of 
religion, or in the alternative, advances religion by taking steps to sustain and increase religious 
beliefs. Mallon J made no more reference explicitly to the latter issue of how those who obtain 
  
57  Ibid. 
58  Re Banfield (Deceased), above n 31. 
59  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [93]. 
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money will therefore sustain and increase religious beliefs, although the judgment did make 
reference in the footnotes to an affidavit that stated:60 
It is also hoped and expected that once the borrower has repaid the principal of their loan they, as God's 
stewards of their money, will increase their Christian giving and/or the giving of their time to Christian 
services. 
C Conclusions on Liberty Trust 
As noted earlier in the article, the Canterbury Development Corp case firmly entrenched the 
notion that, whilst the desire to assist others is laudable, there must be a sufficient connection 
between that object and the actual purpose that it is intended to relieve. The affidavit above clearly 
denotes that the Liberty Trust merely "hopes" that the borrower will increase their Christian giving 
and/or giving of their time. I submit that the possibility of helping others in this fashion is too 
remote for it to qualify as a charitable purpose. I do acknowledge that the affidavit also mentions the 
word "expects". However the Trust did also state that only a limited survey was undertaken on this 
matter and not all borrowers did indeed fulfil this expectation, thus highlighting the meaninglessness 
of the word "expectation" and emphasising instead that the real essence of the advancement of 
religion in this context is merely a hope, rather than an expectation.61 Mallon J does note that 
contributors do not determine whether they will actually receive a loan, nor how much it will be 
worth; and if a loan is received it must be repaid in full with the repayments being circulated for the 
use of others.62 However, there is no further explanation forthcoming as to the application of these 
figures and statements. As a result, I respectfully suggest that this element of the submission 
requires further consideration, and as it stands, I cannot distinguish it from the established argument 
in the Canterbury Development Corp case, that the purposes of the Trust must represent more than a 
hope. 
I do however concur fully with Mallon J that the Liberty Trust clearly has its foundations in 
religion and that the Trust undertakes to perform good works, as opposed to merely defining good 
works.63 Conversely, I do not concur with Mallon J's view that the work of the Liberty Trust is the 
same as that of the work carried out by the Pilsdon Community in Re Banfield (Deceased), as 
referred to earlier in this article. The Pilsdon Community reached out to those in need and provided 
practical Christian support; theirs was a tangible assistance. Whilst the lending scheme provided by 
the Liberty Trust may operate under two churches, and the message is undoubtedly religious, I 
submit that Re Banfield (Deceased) may be distinguished because the purposes of the two trusts, 
  
60  Ibid, at fn 62. 
61  Ibid. 
62  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [115]. 
63  At [96]. 
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and their functions, are different. By its own admissions, the Liberty Trust demonstrates biblical 
principles by loaning interest free money to enable the borrower to live debt free, thus enabling 
them to "be free to fulfil God's call upon their lives."64 There is no consideration as to how this will 
be achieved, and as the affidavit states, fulfilling God's call may be expected, but is not guaranteed.  
The Trust also clearly states that the contributions "assist with our charitable activities and build 
an interest free storehouse to help others."65 The use of the word "and" indicates that the Trust has two 
purposes: the first is to provide charitable assistance to others, and the second is to provide interest free 
loans, thus precluding the latter from being included in its charitable considerations, although it may 
indeed have its basis in religious teachings. The question then arises as to the actual overall purpose of 
the Liberty Trust. This answer can again be found in the words of the Trust. It states that a contribution 
to the Trust:66  
… is a donation to Liberty Trust to help others. Approximately 5% is currently spent teaching the 
Bible's financial principles and assisting the poor and our administration, and the remaining 95% builds 
our storehouse to assist others.   
The dominant purpose of the Trust is therefore to provide interest free loans, whilst its ancillary 
purpose is to teach the Bible's financial principles, assist those in need and administer the Trust.   
It may be argued that the provision of interest free loans is ancillary to the teaching of the 
Bible's financial principles and assisting the poor, but discussions in both Re Education New 
Zealand Trust67 and Re The Grand Lodge of Antient Free and Accepted Masons in New Zealand68 
suggest that where a trust activity constitutes 30 per cent of the trust's overall activities, then this 
could not be construed as ancillary, and indeed, must be considered as a dominant purpose.69 I 
submit therefore that on the facts the Liberty Trust differs greatly from Re Banfield (Deceased), and 
as such, should be distinguished. Additionally, the overall purpose of the Liberty Trust is not 
charitable because its overall purpose is to provide interest free loans. I do not support the notion 
that those loans fulfil the requirements of advancing religion. Indeed, it would appear that the 
Liberty Trust itself, as evidenced by the public information provided, also separates its charitable 
work from its lending scheme.  
  
64  Liberty Trust "Questions & Answers" <www.libertytrust.co.nz> at Question 1. 
65  Ibid, at Question 2 (emphasis added). 
66  Ibid, at Question 5. 
67  Re Education New Zealand Trust (2010) 24 NZTC 24 (HC). 
68  Re The Grand Lodge of Antient Free and Accepted Masons in New Zealand [2011] 1 NZLR 277 (HC) 
[Grand Lodge].  
69  For further discussion see Juliet Chevalier-Watts "Freemasonry and Charity" [2011] NZLJ 50 at 50–53. 
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Therefore, I cannot concur with Mallon J's conclusion that "Liberty Trust's activities are within 
the existing bounds of this category."70 In addition, I am surprised by Mallon J's further comment 
that to find otherwise "would be to confine advancement of religion back to church services, the 
building of churches and the like which is not in keeping with … Lawlor."71 Mallon J most 
pertinently noted that the point in Lawlor is that "methods of preaching and extending a gospel or a 
faith alter and develop with the changing years"72 and many cases reflect the fact that practical 
outworkings are now accepted as advancing religion. However, if Mallon J were to have found that 
the Liberty Trust did not fulfil the requirements of advancing religion, this would not have 
undermined or negated the established authorities which state that the concept of the advancement 
of religion has evolved over the years. That notion is still true, and will remain true. However, the 
real question is whether the loan scheme that underpins the purposes of the Liberty Trust truly 
advances religion. The evidence suggests that such a loan scheme does not advance religion, even 
when one acknowledges the evolution of this charitable head, because the notion of helping advance 
the teachings of the Bible through a loan scheme is too remote a possibility. In contrast to Mallon J's 
well-reasoned view, I submit that finding the loan scheme to advance religion extends that 
charitable head beyond the prescribed realms of advancing religion. It potentially undermines the 
strict criteria that the courts and the Charities Commission have been keen to sustain in order to 
maintain the value to charities, and to maintain public trust and confidence in the stringent 
requirements of obtaining charitable status. 
VI PUBLIC BENEFIT 
A trust must also carry out its purposes for the benefit of the public, or at least a sufficient 
section of the public. Gifts for the advancement of religion will generally be presumed to confer a 
public benefit,73 so although the starting point is the presumption of public benefit, "it remains for 
the court to be satisfied that the gift satisfies the public benefit requirement."74   
A Public Benefit Test 
In the present case there was no issue with the objects of the Trust being contrary to public 
policy, nor with the aims of biblical or Christian teachings. The issue is rather whether the scheme 
conferred a private or public benefit. 
  
70  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [98]. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  See Chevalier-Watts, above n 4, at 56 for further discussion on the presumption of public benefit. See also 
Charities Act 2006 (UK), s 3, which has removed the presumption of public benefit in the United Kingdom. 
74  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [100]. 
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The Charities Commission submitted that:75 
… Liberty Trust's scheme is simply "edification by example" which does not meet the public benefit 
test. The [Charities Commission] submits that this is because the scheme principally confers private 
benefits whereas, to be a charitable purpose, any private benefit must be ancillary to the wider charitable 
purpose. The [Charities Commission] submits that any wider community benefit from a mortgage 
scheme, not based on need, but based on religious financial principles is too remote. 
The Charities Commission relied on the principles expounded in Re The Grand Lodge of Antient 
Free and Accepted Masons in New Zealand (Grand Lodge) concerning public benefit. In this case it 
was stated that whilst there may have been a public benefit, the organisation primarily existed for 
the self-improvement of its members, and whilst that is undoubtedly laudable, this does not meet the 
stringent requirements of conferring a public benefit, and indeed, any conferred public benefit 
would be too remote.76 Mallon J in the instant case quickly discounted the relevance of Grand 
Lodge, noting that "a difference between that case and the position here is that Liberty Trust's 
edifying example is directly linked to the Christian faith."77 It is correct that the Grand Lodge case 
does not link directly to matters pertaining to religion. However, the principles pertaining to private 
benefit still remain, thus perhaps should not have been discounted quite so readily. Instead, Mallon J 
referred to the relevance of Gilmour v Coates78 and Re Hetherington79 as religiously pertinent 
cases.80   
In the former case, the Court had to consider whether a gift to a closed order of nuns had 
sufficient public benefit. The Court determined that the edifying benefits of private prayer on the 
public and the nuns' efforts in achieving their own salvation would not construe a sufficient and 
tangible enough public benefit. Therefore the gift failed to be charitable. Mallon J noted that Liberty 
Trust rejected the notion that Gilmour v Coates, and other private religion purposes, were applicable 
in the present situation, stating that the Trust's edifying example is visible because it is a scheme that 
is open to all and there is continuing communication encouraging the advancement of religion. In 
this respect, the preferred case is that of Re Hetherington, in which a gift for the celebration of 
public masses was held to be charitable because the public that attended would benefit from the 
improving effect of such a celebration.   
  
75  At [116]. 
76  At [60]. 
77  At [117]. 
78  Gilmour v Coates [1949] AC 426 (HL). 
79  Re Hetherington [1989] 2 WLR 1094 (Ch). 
80  Liberty Trust v Charities Commission, above n 1, at [118]–[120]. 
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Mallon J accepted Liberty Trust's submission that Gilmour v Coates and Grand Lodge should be 
distinguished because the scheme in the present case is open to the public. Whilst the contributors to 
the scheme receive a private benefit, in other words, a loan, that private benefit is part and parcel of 
Christian living. The contributors therefore accept that the scheme is a religious one.81 
B Public Benefit in Liberty Trust 
I acknowledge without issue that there can be no doubt that the scheme in the present case is 
linked to religion, as made clear by the Liberty Trust and by Mallon J, but I am not persuaded that 
the loan scheme would directly confer the requisite public benefit. In finding that it does, Liberty 
Trust has extended the doctrine of the advancement of religion beyond the realms envisioned. 
Mallon J stated explicitly that "private benefit is part and parcel of Christian living".82 This may be 
an accepted fact but beyond that there must be an overall purpose of public benefit, so the private 
benefit should be ancillary to the public benefit. The desire of the Trust is to assist those receiving 
the loan to live debt free so that Christian works may be accomplished more readily. As has already 
been discussed, this is a hope – albeit a commendable one – and case law is clear that a mere hope 
does not equate to a charitable purpose. Mallon J stated that she finds it "difficult to distinguish [the 
scheme] from a mass in a Church which is open to the public."83 I respectfully submit that a 
mortgage scheme established to relieve private financial impecuniosities with a connection to the 
Christian faith may be distinguished from public prayers whose prime purpose is to propagate the 
Christian faith, because the benefits of the loan scheme are too narrowly focused on its adherents. 
As Mallon J so pertinently states, the scheme is about being able to "lead a Christian life free of the 
burdens of debt",84 which appears primarily to support the notion of private benefit. In respect of 
this assertion, I think it pertinent to consider the public benefit matters so rigorously addressed in the 
cases of Presbyterian Church of New Zealand Beneficiary Fund v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(Presbyterian Church)85 and Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Hester).86  
In the former case, the Presbyterian Church created a Beneficiary Fund for the benefit of retired 
ministers of the Church. The Fund fell within a superannuation category. The primary benefits 
available under the Fund were payments of an annuity to retiring ministers, as well as other financial 
benefits. The consideration for the Court, inter alia, was whether there was sufficient public benefit 
  
81  Ibid, at [121]–[122]. 
82  At [121]. 
83  At [122]. 
84  At [125]. 
85  Presbyterian Church of New Zealand Beneficiary Fund v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1994] 3 NZLR 
363 (HC) [Presbyterian Church]. 
86  Hester v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2005] 2 NZLR 172 (CA) [Hester]. 
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for the Fund to be charitable. It is acknowledged that the facts differ from those of the Liberty Trust 
case, however it is submitted that the principles are still entirely relevant because of the key issue of 
the advancement of religion. In its considerations, the Court reflected upon the Commissioner's view 
that the purpose of the Fund was not to advance religion but to provide benefits to the members of 
the Fund, thus depriving the Fund of having any public benefit.87 The Court concurred, noting that 
the Fund's objectives were to protect its ministers by ensuring that they were financially secure 
enough throughout their lifetime with the Church "in accordance with the mutual commitment of the 
Church and minister to a lifelong undertaking."88 It was this close connection with the Church that 
provided the Court with the answer to the issue of public benefit because "where the overall purpose 
goes to the benefit of persons who are demonstrably part of the structural workings of the Church 
overall"89 then the public benefit test is met. In providing such financial support, the ministers will 
be supported for their lifetime by the Church, thus ensuring the Christian faith is expounded. 
Therefore, even though the private benefit was not incidental, when considered in the context of the 
Church and its ministrations, the purpose was deemed charitable. In other words:90 
… the relevant nexus exists and the retired ministers who financially benefit are an integral part of the 
structure and workings of the Church and without them the Church would cease to exist. Neither would 
they have been induced to take up their calling without the assurance of lifetime security in the manner 
described and uncontroverted in the evidence. 
Therefore, although there is a private benefit to the ministers, without this benefit, the Church 
would suffer detriment; therefore the very nature of the fund deprives it of a private benefit.91 It is 
submitted that the requirement for the existence of a nexus is a relevant consideration in relation to 
the scheme in Liberty Trust, and I would argue that in applying the principles developed in 
Presbyterian Church to the Liberty Trust case, the nexus between the beneficiaries of the scheme in 
Liberty Trust and the Church cannot be made out. The purpose of the scheme is to alleviate financial 
hardship with the desire that the principles of the Christian religion should be expounded as a result 
of releasing the recipient of financial burdens. This link is not made out in the later case as it is so 
succinctly in the earlier case. The private benefit, although not necessarily incidental in the 
Presbyterian Church case, is so deeply ingrained in the overall context of the Church that the public 
benefit could not exist without the private benefit. Conversely in the Liberty Trust case no such 
fundamental commitments exist, and the churches under which the Liberty Trust sits would not fail 
  
87  Presbyterian Church, above n 85, at 370. 
88  At 371. 
89  Ibid. 
90  At 372. 
91  At 376. 
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as a result of the financial benefits not being available to the beneficiaries of the Fund. This 
therefore indicates that the private benefit in Liberty Trust is not negated. 
The Hester case indicates, at least impliedly, the discomfort the courts feel at addressing the 
issue of public benefit and advancement of religion. It considers further, and in great detail, the 
thorny issues raised in the Presbyterian Church case relating to superannuation plans, and, inter alia, 
the challenges faced by the courts when considering public and private benefit. Whilst the Court of 
Appeal in the later case confirmed that the private benefit for ministers receiving such funds was not 
inconsistent with the requirements of charitable trusts, charitable status could not be extended to 
trusts for church employees generally. 
Hammond J in Hester eloquently sets out the pitfalls of considering such difficult and 
contemporary matters, which represent the very foundations of the original proposition, stating:92 
… given the very considerable concessions made to charities, and given much contemporary 
agnosticism and even seeming indifference in many quarters to religion, what is it that today supports 
the concession in favour of religious charities, and more particularly, where are the edges of this head of 
charity to be drawn? 
I believe this is a key consideration for any court when determining contemporaneous matters 
relating to the advancement of religion. The Court of Appeal in Hester clearly had such matters at 
the forefront of its considerations because it regarded Presbyterian Church as being at "the 
outermost limits of the existing doctrine"93 and stated "the scheme under consideration [in Hester] is 
well beyond the existing doctrine for an allowable religious charitable trust"94 because it was too 
broadly conceived. In applying this concern to the Liberty Trust case, I submit that such concerns 
are analogous to those set out in this latest case. I note that Mallon J in Liberty Trust did indeed 
acknowledge the cautionary words offered by Hammond J in Hester regarding the bounds of the 
doctrine, although it was noted that "where the bounds of this head of charity properly are drawn is 
not necessarily clear."95 Mallon J's concerns about such boundaries are certainly not without 
foundation, as case law does little to offer assistance with regard to such contemporary challenges. 
However, taking into consideration the very real concerns expressed in Hester, it would perhaps be 
prudent to exercise a generally conservative approach in cases where the private and public benefit 
dichotomy might be conceived to be on such a cusp. This is because once the boundaries are 
extended, the support for the concessions offered to such charities may wane, and the doctrine itself 
will be seen to be strained beyond conceivable recognition.   
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C Conclusions on the Public Benefit Test 
As a result, I submit that the public benefit test in the Liberty Trust case has been rebutted and 
that, whilst there is no doubt that contemporary challenges generally require contemporary answers, 
there are some circumstances in which a conservative approach might be more favourable in order 
to provide judicial certainty and to prevent possible concerns being raised with regard to policy 
issues. In rebutting the public benefit test I submit that there would be no issue with confining the 
advancement of religion to the confines of church services, or to the traditional methods associated 
with propagating religious views, because case law already supports the evolution of the practical 
outworkings of advancing religion. What is perhaps not supported in case law is the development of 
the public benefit test in such controversial circumstances since the repercussions for such 
development could be far-reaching. 
VII CONCLUSION 
There is no doubting the difficulties faced by the courts when having to determine such matters. 
Preceding case law offers so little in terms of guidance or limitations on such modern day matters, 
and it is expected that the jurisprudence will continue to evolve in these areas as it has been doing 
for decades. However, although change may be welcomed in order to clarify uncertainty or to 
provide much needed interpretation of the common law or statutes, some changes that occur may be 
to the apparent detriment of such certainties and their appearance may undermine established 
doctrines. 
The advancement of religion is undoubtedly a controversial head of charity because its 
foundations are based on a system of beliefs that are at best intangible, and at worst openly criticised 
by non-believers, especially when the New Zealand case law supports the notion that the public 
benefit associated with the advancement of religion should be presumed. Decades of case law 
support the evolution of the advancement of religion and how it may be undertaken, and the author 
firmly supports the ethos that the outworkings of religions should not be constrained to the 
traditional methods employed from yesteryear. The author does however contend that certain 
aspects relating to the advancement of religion should be interpreted in a more conservative manner 
(as expressed keenly in cases such as Presbyterian Church and Hester) in order to set more defined 
boundaries, which are currently clearly absent. Such boundaries would not be to the detriment of the 
advancement of religion, nor would they presuppose that the advancement of religion should cease 
to evolve, as clearly socio-economic advances will always underpin and encourage such 
developments, and charities and the law must meet those demands. However, where an issue is on 
such a controversial cusp, as in the matter of the Liberty Trust, and the jurisprudence suggests that 
such matters should be approached with caution, then the author supports judicial caution in 
determining whether to expand the existing boundaries so extensively. It is hoped that when further 
cases of a similar nature come before the courts, as inevitably will occur, the courts will look to the 
effect of expanding such doctrines and will question whether such evolution will further, or rather, 
detract from judicial certainty. 
